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Abstract
Background: During the last three decades, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Iran has fallen considerably; from 
6.5 per woman in 1983 to 1.89 in 2010. This paper analyzes the extent to which economic determinants at the 
micro and macro levels are associated with the number of children in Iranian households.
Methods: Household data from the 2010 Household Expenditure and Income Survey (HEIS) is linked to 
provincial data from the 2010 Iran Multiple-Indicator Demographic and Health Survey (IrMIDHS), the National 
Census of Population and Housing conducted in 1986, 1996, 2006 and 2011, and the 1985–2010 Iran statistical 
year books. Fertility is measured as the number of children in each household. A random intercept multilevel 
Poisson regression function is specified based on a collective model of intra-household bargaining power to 
investigate potential determinants of the number of children in Iranian households. 
Results: Ceteris paribus (other things being equal), probability of having more children drops significantly as 
either real per capita educational expenditure or real total expenditure of each household increase. Both the 
low- and the high-income households show probabilities of having more children compared to the middle-
income households. Living in provinces with either higher average amount of value added of manufacturing 
establishments or lower average rate of house rent is associated to higher probability of having larger number 
of children. Higher levels of gender gap indices, resulting in household’s wife’s limited power over household 
decision-making, positively affect the probability of having more children.
Conclusion: Economic determinants at the micro and macro levels, distribution of intra-household bargaining 
power between spouses and demographic covariates determined fertility behavior of Iranian households.
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Introduction
The number of children ever born per woman has important 
implications for public health, economic climate, and 
population structure. It can influence infant, child and 
maternal mortality, obstetric and child health services, 
economic growth (or decline), independency burden, labor 
force participation, and age structure of populations (1).
According to the Population Reference Bureau (PRB), Iran is 
amongst the twenty most populated countries of the world. 
Nevertheless, during the last three decades, the Total Fertility 
Rate (TFR) in this country has fallen considerably from 
6.5 per woman in 1983 to 1.89 in 2010 which is below the 
replacement fertility rate (2).  It is interesting to note that Iran 
now has the lowest fertility rate in the Middle East (2).
There is a rich literature about the demographic feature 
of fertility in Iran including fertility transition and how 
expansion in education, reduction in child mortality, 
urbanization, wide access to family planning services and 
religion have contributed to the recent fertility decline in 
this country (3–11). However, to our knowledge, the impact 
of economic factors on Iranian fertility behavior has not 
sufficiently been elaborated.
The objective of the paper is to provide an economic 
explanation for the dramatic change in fertility among Iranian 
households. The paper applies the intra-household bargaining 
model framework to investigate the extent to which economic 
determinants at the household and provincial levels are 
associated with fertility behavior. We link the household data 
from the 2010 Household Expenditure and Income Survey 
(HEIS) to the provincial data from the 2010 Iran Multiple-
Indicator Demographic and Health Survey (IrMIDHS), the 
National Census of Population and Housing and the Iran 
statistical year books. Then, a random intercept multilevel 
Poisson regression function is specified based on a collective 
model of intra-household bargaining power in which spouses’ 
bargaining power is measured through extra-household 
indices of gender gap including indices of gender gap 
determined outside of household.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we provide theoretical 
background of intra-household bargaining models. In the 
Following section, different data sources are introduced. 
After that, we explain the multilevel method and count 
data model and define the explanatory variables included 
in the multilevel Poisson model. The subsequent section 
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focuses on the relationship between the household and 
provincial characteristics and the number of children in 
households (as a measure for fertility). Next, the findings are 
discussed extensively and in the final secession, we draw a 
brief conclusion.
Theoretical background
In an economic view, children fall into several main categories 
such as public goods, investment goods and consumer durable 
goods. When children are described as consumer durable 
goods, they are considered to provide a flow of utility to their 
parents (12,13).
Some economists have tried to explore fertility behavior 
of individuals and households based on microeconomic 
theories. Malthus’s classic essay is one of the primary economic 
studies of fertility behavior. The essay points to the conclusion 
that fertility rate change in direct proportion to the total 
income (14). Nonetheless, the Malthusian approach cannot 
describe fertility of developed economies for the reason 
that it neglects two features of these economies, including 
opportunity cost of parenthood and importance of educated 
and healthy children, which both persuade parents to have 
smaller families (15–17). Becker’ theory of fertility behavior, 
specially the notion of the “quality and quantity of children”, 
which is a substantial contribution to family and household 
economics, suggests those parents who give higher quality to 
their children usually choose a smaller family size (18–21). 
Becker et al. and Becker and Lewis emphasize the role of 
economic determinants such as household income, female 
labor force participation and childbearing cost in household 
fertility (15,18–20,22). A main conclusion of Becker’ theory is 
that unlike Malthusian theory, the effect of income on fertility 
is ambiguous depending on the extent of offsetting income 
influence versus substitution influence (19,21,23).
 According to Becker’s unitary model, spouses maximize one 
single utility function reflecting their same preferences about 
quality or quantity of children (21,23–25). Samuelson also 
develops a household social welfare function with one joint 
utility function (26). In contrast, intra-household bargaining 
decision-making models developed by Manser and Brown 
(27), and McElroy and Horney (28) advocate different utility 
functions for spouses. Intra-household bargaining refers to 
negotiations that occur between members of a household in 
order to arrive at decisions regarding the household unit (29) 
and intra-household bargaining power is the relative capacity 
of the household members especially spouses to dominate 
the other in a negotiation over decisions such as quantity 
of children. If all household members are on same position 
in a negotiation, they will have equal bargaining power, and 
conversely, if one has a dominant position in the negotiation, 
they have unequal bargaining power (29,30). Non-cooperative 
and cooperative bargaining settings are two categories of intra-
household models which are based on the game-theoretic 
framework. In non-cooperative games, household members 
maximize their utility, taking the other members’ behaviors 
as given (27–29,31,32). One weakness of this approach is that 
a non-cooperative game does not essentially have a Pareto 
efficient intra-household allocation of welfare (23,24,33). In 
cooperative games, household members’ aim is to reach an 
agreement on how to divide the gains from living together. 
In a cooperative game, a Pareto efficacy of intra-household 
allocation of welfare is achieved. Still, both cooperative and 
non-cooperative games depend on a particular bargaining 
concept which is a limitation (21,27,28). The collective model 
developed by Chiappori (30,34) and Apps and Rees (35) has 
only one assumption that all intra-household decisions are 
Pareto efficient; thus, it has the least limitation. In this model, 
household allocation problem can be defined as a unique 
solution to the following maximization problem:
(1 )A BW U Uµ µ= + −                                                              (1)
UA and UB are utility function of two household members A 
and B. μ and (1-μ) refer to the welfare weights. These welfare 
weights are interpreted as bargaining power of household 
members (24,25,30,34,35).
A number of studies have recognized, at the macro level, the 
relationship between fertility and economic determinants 
such as per capita income, employment rate, inflation rate, 
economic uncertainty, and economic growth (36–43). The 
other works have noted the association between fertility and 
economic status of households or individuals at the micro 
level (32,38,44–47). Moreover, fertility behavior has been 
investigated, at the micro level, in the framework of  household 
bargaining power. In this approach, the intra-household 
bargain power is derived from individual determinants 
such as spouses’ income, wage rate, assets, age, education 
and woman empowerment (32,48–51), or from household 
determinants such as age, educational and wage differences 
between spouses (29,52,53). Other studies have pointed at the 
key role of contextual factors, specifically gendered institutions 
reflecting asymmetric social norms, cultural beliefs and laws 
in bargaining power of household members (54–57). A few 
dimensions of gender gap (meaning the differences between 
female and male in social, political, intellectual, cultural, or 
economic attainments or attitudes) such as wage gender gap, 
polygamy, political participation etc. have also been used at 
higher levels as proxies for intra-household bargaining power 
(29,58,59). We therefore conclude that bargaining power in 
a single household is partly resulted from extra-household 
indices of gender gap driving us to accept the negative 
relationship between extra-household indices of gender gap 
and bargaining power of wives.
In this paper, the spouses’ bargaining power is explained in 
terms of extra-household indices of gender gap which are 
based on benchmarking tools introduced by World Economic 
Forum (WEF). These benchmarking tools include economic 
participation and opportunity, educational attainment, 
political empowerment and health and survival (60,61). 
Based on the evidence mentioned in the previous paragraph, 
we assume a negative relationship between extra-household 
indices of gender gap and intra-household woman’s 
bargaining power. 
An expert panel consists of economists, sociologists-
demographist, statisticians and health economists developed 
for determining content validity in this study. Selected 
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measures of gender gap as indicators for “intra-household 
bargaining power” were evaluated by the panel. They reached 
an agreement that selected variables could represent all 
aspects of gender gap which have introduced by WEF and 
recognized those variables as appropriate proxies for intra-
household bargaining power. 
To test reliability, the final sample of households was split into 
two subsets in which 90% of households in sample provide 
first subset and remaining households provide the second 
one. The result of the test confirmed the overall consistency 
of our measures. 
Materials and methods
Data sources and sample selection
The first level of observations consists of households and the 
second level contains the Iranian provinces in the year of 2010.
We apply different data sources: 1) the 2010 HEIS, 2) the 
2010 IrMIDHS, 3) the National Census of Population and 
Housing, and 4) the Iran statistical year books provided by 
Statistical Center of Iran. We link the micro-data provided 
by the HEIS to the published provincial data from the three 
other data sources. 
The HEIS, operated by Statistical Center of Iran and 
Iranian central bank, is a nationally representative survey 
administered to two samples of urban and rural households 
in all provinces. The 2010 HEIS is the main data set in this 
study. A valid and reliable questionnaire, which was designed 
and employed by this centre, was used for data collection. The 
household-level variables consisting of number of children 
in each household, household educational expenditure 
in real price, total household expenditure in real price, 
income deciles, household’s wife’s employment status and 
gender composition of children have been constructed by 
extracting data from this survey. The total sample includes 
38950 households. The present study emphasizes on the 
normal type of families, indicated by the monogamous 
married couples living together and having their own 
children. Hence, we exclude the following households from 
the sample: households with single parent because they could 
not exhibit distribution of bargaining power between parents 
and polygamous households since this study is based on the 
assumption that each household has one married woman as 
the wife. Households including wives aged less than fifteen 
years when the first child had been borne are dropped because 
they were under the childbearing age. We drop households 
including wives aged more than forty at the time of interview 
because the number of children in these households may 
be fewer than total number of children, which has not been 
recorded by the HEIS. Hence, limiting the sample to younger 
wives lowers the risk of underestimating the total number of 
children. We also eliminate childless households because we 
do not have any information about the length of marriage 
among them, and those with a multiple births because they 
may have unwanted children. Therefore, the final sample 
consists of 13952 households containing monogamous 
married couples living within thirty provinces.
The 2010 IrMIDHS, which was carried out by the Iran 
ministry of health, includes a representative sample of 31350 
households in all provinces. In this paper, we use a number of 
provincial-level variables from this survey, including unmet 
needs for contraception and polygamy rate.
The National Census of Population and Housing, which was 
conducted by the Statistical Center of Iran, was started in 
1956 and conducted every ten years until 2006 and every five 
years after that time. We make use of the surveys conducted in 
1986, 1996, 2006 and 2011 to compile a number of provincial 
variables by calculating the average amount of each variable 
during stated period. The variables are the population of each 
province, the average percentage of urban population and 
the average household size in each province. Moreover, the 
provinces with sizable minorities of Sunnite population were 
selected from this data source. 
Other variables, at the provincial level, were obtained from 
the “International Statistics”, “Price Indices” and “Political 
Statistics” were parts of the 1985–2010 Iran statistical 
year books. We use an average of selected variables such 
as the average rate of house rent, the average value added 
in manufacturing establishments, the average amount of 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), the average employment rate, 
the average male to female wage ratio in manufacturing 
establishments, the average ratio of highly educated male 
to female employees in manufacturing establishments, the 
average female employment rate, the average ratio of male to 
female election onto City and Village Councils, in addition to 
the average percentage of urban population in each province 
over this period. The logic behind using an average value of 
data for multiple years is the fact that fertility is determined, 
developed, and changed during a long period of time. As a 
result, all economic and demographic conditions during 
those years could impact the Iranian fertility behavior.
Method and measures
In this paper, the data has a two-level hierarchal structure in 
which 13952 households are nested within thirty provinces. 
It should be noticed that the Alborz province was formed by 
dividing the Tehran province into two provinces (Tehran and 
Alborz) in the year of 2010. But there was no comprehensive 
separate data and information about Alborz province in 
2010. Therefore, Alborz province is regarded as part of 
Tehran province. 
Clustering the observations within higher-level units 
can result in a hierarchically structured data set in which 
observations are not independent. The Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) method is not suitable for observations of this 
type because it can give inefficient estimates of parameters 
and downwardly biased estimates of standard errors (62–64). 
Besides, the dependent variable is counts of children in 
each household. The count data are constrained to be non-
negative. Fitting a normal model to these data can cause 
negative predictions (65–67). Therefore, we apply a multilevel 
count model based on the extra Poisson distribution with 
random intercept to account for hierarchal structure of the 
observations and to avoid any bias resulted from fitting a 
linear model to count data. According to evidence (66,67), the 
probability mass function of yi conditional on xi in Poisson 
distribution is:
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Therefore, the regression function based on a collective 
household model is specified as:
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Following similar studies (32,44,58), Childnum, the number 
of children in household (i.e. those children still living with 
their parents), is proxied for total children ever born in each 
household. We use this variable as a measure of fertility in 
the sample. Lfpoure is the offset variable to control for the 
“exposure time” (i.e. the years that a household’s wife is at risk 
of childbearing). It is defined as the natural logarithm of the 
“age of the oldest child in the household plus one” as a proxy 
for marriage span because the HEIS does not record any 
information about the length of marriage. X1ij and X2j are the 
individual-level explanatory variables and the provincial-level 
ones respectively. υ0j explains the province random effects and 
ɛij is the individual-level error.
The main Independent variables, measured either at the 
household or provincial levels, are economic determinants. 
Education can enhance the quality of children. Hence, to 
test the quantity-quality hypothesis of childbearing, we enter 
the per capita household educational expenditure in real 
price based on CPI of the provinces in 2010 which express 
parents’ preference for the educated children as an indicator 
for the quality of children. More, we add the total household 
expenditure in real price based on CPI of the provinces in 
2010, as a proxy for household income. Another independent 
variable is a categorical variable which divide households into 
three categories: households in the first to third income deciles 
(the low-income households), households in the fourth to 
seventh income deciles (the middle-income households), and 
those in the eighth to tenth income deciles (the high-income 
households). One dummy variable, indicating whether or 
not a household’s wife has a job is included to measure the 
opportunity cost of childbearing and childrearing. All above 
covariates were measured at the household level. 
A number of provincial level covariates are incorporated into 
the model to determine the economic status, at the macro 
level. These independent variables are the average rate of 
house rent, measuring the cost of living in each province, the 
average value added in manufacturing establishments which 
is indicative for industrial and economic development, the 
average amount of CPI representing inflation rate of each 
province, and the average employment rate.
Gender gap indices are derived from a number of variables at 
the provincial level to capture benchmarking tools introduced 
by WEF. The main variables consist of the average male to 
female wage ratio in manufacturing establishments, the 
average ratio of highly educated male to female employees (i.e. 
employees with master or doctorial degree) in manufacturing 
establishments, the average female employment rate, in 
addition to the average ratio of male to female election onto 
City and Village Councils of Iran during its first, second 
and third periods. Two other variables, selected to measure 
gender gap based on the existing literature, are percentage of 
unmet needs for contraception (68,69) and polygamy rate. 
Polygamy is known as an indicator of discriminatory family 
code which reflects gender gap (29,58,59). Unmet needs for 
contraception is the other key indicator reflecting inequality 
in reproductive health as one of the indices of gender gap 
developed by WEF (68,69). 
In order to control for demographic factors, we add 
household-level characteristics in addition to provincial level 
covariates; the model contains a categorical variable classified 
as “having only boys”, “having only girls” and “having mixed-
gender children” to specify gender composition of children. 
Two different dummies, indicating whether or not either 
wife or husband is literate, are used as independent variables, 
explaining variation in the fertility behavior of literate and 
illiterate spouses. The average percentage of urban population 
in each province is incorporated as a demographic covariate 
at the second level. Further, a binary variable, defined as living 
in the provinces with sizable minorities of Sunnite population, 
is included in the model. These two demographic dummy 
covariates are used to control for the regional, religious and 
developmental differences which can impact fertility in Iran. 
We also incorporate the average provincial household size 
to measure the effect of social norms related to reproductive 
choice on fertility behavior of households, as suggested by 
previous studies (70,71).
Data analyses are performed using MLwiN version 2.20 
(Bristol University, Bristol) and Stata version 9 (Stata 
Corporation, College Station, Texas). We use Iterated 
Generalized Least Square (IGLS) estimation and the 2nd 
order Predictive Quasi Likelihood (PQL) method.
Results
Table 1 reports the means and the standard deviations of 
continuous variables, and the percentage of the categorical 
variables and Table 2 reports the distribution of the number 
of children in the Iranian households.
The average number of children per household is 2.15 and 
both the median and the mode are two children. The provinces 
of Gilan and Sistan and Baluchistan, with the average numbers 
of children equal to 1.69 and 2.92, display the lowest and the 
highest numbers of children per household, respectively. 
While 88% of households in Gilan and Mazandaran provinces 
have a maximum of two children, nearly 52% in Sistan and 
Baluchistan and 51% in Kohkloye and Boyerahmad have at 
least three children. This suggests a considerable difference 
in the average numbers of children per household across the 
Iranian provinces.
Since, the variance of the number of children is 1.19, which 
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is quite less than its mean, the dependent variable has an 
under-dispersion distribution; hence, we consider an extra 
Poisson distribution assumption in the estimation procedure. 
Significance level is assumed to be at 0.05.
Table 3 reports the final results from the multilevel count 
data model. The value of the Wald test indicates the overall 
goodness of fit of the model. The standard deviation of 
the provincial random effects (συ) is small but significantly 
different from zero meaning that intercepts vary slightly over 
the provinces. 
Because the coefficients are not presented as marginal effects, 
only their signs are interpreted here. More, each variable’s 
coefficient is interpreted under ceteris paribus meaning that 
while interpreting each variable, all other variables should be 
equal or hold constant (65–67). 
The coefficient of household per capita educational 
expenditure is significant and negative. Spending more on 
the education and training of the children is related to a 
lower probability of having more children. The variable of 
the total household expenditure has a significantly negative 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of household’s characteristics
Variable Household Wife Husband
Number of children in each household 2.15 (0.01) _ _
Age _ 31.92 (0.05) 37.26 (0.06)
Years at risk of fertility 10.38 (0.05) _ _
Literate _ 0.86 0.91
Both spouses are literate 0.83 _ _
Employed _ 0.12 0.93
Gender composition of children
   Girl 0.25 _ _
   Boy 0.30 _ _
   Mixed-gender children 0.45 _ _
Income deciles
   The low-income households 0.30 _ _
   The middle-income households 0.54 _ _
   The high-income households 0.16 _ _
Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses
Table 2. Observed distribution of the number of children
Count Number Percent
1 4150 30
2 5707 41
3 2634 19
4 978 7
5 309 2
6-9 174 1
Total 13952 100
coefficient. Noticeably, the estimated parameters for either the 
low-income households or the high-income ones compared 
to the reference group (i.e. the middle-income households) 
are significantly positive. Then, ceteris paribus, both the 
low-income and the high-income households show higher 
probability of having more children than the middle-income 
households. The estimated parameter for the dummy variable 
of being an employed wife is found to be insignificant.
At the second level, the average value added in manufacturing 
establishments has a positive coefficient and the average rate 
of house rent has a significant negative coefficient. Thus, to 
live in the provinces with higher value added in manufacturing 
establishments is associated with a higher probability of 
having more children. By contrast, to live in those provinces 
with higher average rate of house rents is related to have fewer 
children. The coefficients of the average amount of CPI and 
the average employment rate are not significant.
Among variables addressing dimensions of gender gap, 
polygamy rate and unmet needs for contraception and the 
average ratio of highly educated male to female employees 
in manufacturing establishments have significantly positive 
signs. The other variables in this group are insignificant. This 
finding indicates, ceteris paribus, the number of children is 
significantly higher among the households living in provinces 
with higher rate of polygamy, higher rate of unmet needs for 
contraception or lower ratio of highly educated female to 
male employees working in manufacturing establishments.
All of the demographic variables except for the average 
percentage of urban population in each province are 
significant and in the expected directions. The coefficients 
of both dummy variables relating to literacy of wife and 
husband are negative, indicating the inverse relation between 
parents’ literacy and their number of children. Incidentally, 
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the estimated parameter for “having only boys” compared 
to the reference group of “having only girls” is negative and 
significant but the coefficient for “having mixed-gender 
children” is insignificant, which reveal that the number of 
children is higher in households with no boys. The provincial 
average household size has a significant positive coefficient 
and the binary variable for living in the provinces with 
sizable minorities of Sunnite people has significant negative 
coefficient. As a result, living in areas where larger household 
size is more common and living in provinces where the Shiite 
population is dominant increase the probability of having 
more children.
Discussion
In this paper, the statistical analysis is based on a multilevel 
approach, as applied in related works (64,72,73). The standard 
deviation of the provincial effects obtained from the random 
part of the multilevel regression function is statistically 
Table 3. Random intercept model for the number of children in household
Parameters Coefficient Standard Error
Fixed:
Household level variables
Constant -1.876 0.197
Total expenditure in real price (million Rials) -0. 010** 0.000
Per capita educational expenditure in real price (million Rials) -0. 050** 0.000
Income deciles ranks
    The low-income households 0.034** 0.006
    The middle-income households (Reference group)
    The high-income households 0.031** 0.008
Wife is literate -0.063** 0.007
Husband is literate -0.001** 0.008
Gender composition of children
    Girl (Reference group)
    Boy -0.106** 0.009
    Mixed-gender children 0.009 0.008
Provincial level variables
Average value added in manufacturing establishments (million Rials) 0.010* 0.000
Average amount of house rent -0.001* 0.000
Average amount of CPI -0.000 0.000
Average of employment rate 0.001 0.006
Percentage of unmet needs for contraception (in the year of 2010) 0.018** 0.006
Polygamy rate (in the year of 2010) 0.026** 0.005
Average highly educated male to female workers ratio in manufacturing establishments 0.004* 0.001
Average of female employment rate -0.009 0.018
Average ratio of male to female election onto City and Village Councils 0.000 0.000
Average male to female wage ratio in manufacturing establishments 0.013 0.030
Average household size  0.069** 0.015
To live in the provinces with sizable minorities of Sunnite people 0.029** 0.025
Average percentage of urban population -0.001 0.001
Random:
σ
υ
 (between provinces) 0.001** 0.000
σ
ɛ
 (between households) 0.495** 0.004
Wald criteria 1579.073 -
Probability> χ2 0.000 -
Note:  *P< 0.05, **P< 0.01
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significant, providing evidence that the differences in the 
number of children among Iranian households could in part 
be explained by provincial effects.
The empirical results obtained from the fixed part of the 
regression function appear to indicate that economic 
determinants at both household and provincial levels are the 
key factors associated to fertility of Iranian households. First, 
the higher the educational expenditure a household spends 
for each member, the smaller is the number of its children. 
Second, the probability of having a larger number of children 
drops significantly as the real total household expenditure, a 
proxy for household income, rises. These results are supported 
by previous studies (18,22,44,74,75). This suggests that, in 
total, the impact of substitution income on fertility is greater 
than its offsetting effect. These two findings can confirm 
the Becker’s theory of “quality and quantity of children”. In 
general, the preferences of Iranian households have shifted 
towards fewer but higher educated children. Third, the 
probability of having more children is significantly higher 
among both the low-income and the high-income households 
than those of middle-income households. This result is in line 
with some earlier research (38). We can conclude that while 
the high-income households can afford more children with 
good quality, households in the middle-income group decide 
to substitute the quantity with the quality of their children. 
Thus, the high-income households do not lower the number 
of their children as many as those of the middle-income 
ones. However, it should be noted that as the middle-income 
group constitute a sizeable portion of our sample, the negative 
effect of the real expenditure on the number of children can 
be related to the fertility behavior of this specific group. Still, 
some studies have found the reverse (16,38).
We found no significant association between household’s 
wife’s employment status and the number of children (45). 
However, there is broad evidence on the negative association 
between women’s or wives’ employment and fertility at the 
micro level (45). This finding can be explained by the fact 
that only 13% of wives in our sample are employed. Then, the 
opportunity cost of childbearing and childrearing for wives in 
our sample is not as much important as those in samples with 
high percentage of women in the labor market.
Living in provinces with higher average rate of house rent 
and less average amount of the value added in manufacturing 
establishments is inversely associated with the number of 
children, suggesting the direct relation between the macro-
level economic difficulties and the smaller size of households 
in our sample. The results are parallel to the finding of 
related research showing that economic crisis is associated 
with lower fertility and childbearing postponement 
(36–38,40,42,50,76,77). However, there are other studies 
supporting the reverse (76,78).
As discussed earlier, we utilize gender gap dimensions 
measured at the provincial level as indicators of intra-
household bargaining power. Three of the variables referring 
to gender gap indices are significant with the anticipated 
effects. Higher rates of polygamy and unmet needs for 
contraception and a lower rate of scholar female to male 
employees working in the manufacturing establishments as 
indicators for higher level of gender gap cause wives to lose 
their bargaining power over household decision-making 
especially the quantity of children. The lower the household’s 
wife’s gains bargaining power, the more is the number of 
her children. It confirms a negative relation between wives’ 
bargaining power and the number of their children which 
is well established in the literature (29,58,59). We can imply 
that the preference of Iranian women for fewer children but 
of better quality is stronger than their husbands. However, 
only wives with higher bargaining power can express this 
preference and reduce their number of children.
As expected, almost all of the demographic variables are 
statistically significant meaning that, as evidenced by the 
previous research, demographic determinants including 
gender composition of children (9,38,79–82), education 
(9,10,32,73,83), and social norms about household size 
(70,71,84) exert prominent influences over fertility behavior.
According to our results, urbanization has no significant 
influence on the number of children (72,85), meaning that 
variation in household sizes between urban and rural areas 
has been diminished in Iran. Still, it is in contrast with some 
other studies (32,38,83,86,87). However, the probability 
of having more children is higher in provinces with sizable 
religious minorities (10,88–91). It may be rooted in religious 
belief of minorities or more importantly in severe deprivations 
in those provinces. 
This study faced some limitations. First, some of the provincial 
level covariates were derived from individual-level data 
especially those coming from 2010 IrMIDHS. Second, we did 
not access some important information at the first level. As a 
result, cautions should be exercised in interpreting results and 
making conclusions. Third, gender gap as indicator for intra-
household bargaining power was measured based on several 
separate and simple variables which could make concerns 
about developing these two complex concepts. 
The study also had several strengths. One of the strongest 
merits of this study was that we combined several appropriate 
data sources. Additionally, we applied multilevel models to 
analyze determinants of fertility in household and provincial 
level which was the other merit of this study.
Conclusion
This investigation of the determinants influencing the 
number of children among a sample of 13952 Iranian 
monogamous married couples is relied on a collective model 
of household decision-makings and uses a multilevel extra 
Poisson regression function.
The empirical results of the analysis derive us to conclude 
that three groups of determinants influence fertility behavior 
of Iranian households. The first group consists of economic 
factors either at the micro or at the macro levels. Especially 
the findings reveal that: 1) preferences of parents has shifted 
towards fewer but more qualified children, which confirms 
the Becker’s theory of “quality and quantity of children”, and 
2) economic conditions at the macro level such as house rent 
prices and value added in manufacturing establishments 
are related to the number of children. Second, distribution 
of intra-household bargaining power has a strong influence 
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on fertility in Iran. Spouses exercise their power, measured 
through extra-household indices of gender gap to achieve 
their desired number of children. As gender gap indices at 
provincial level increase, wives’ power in household decision-
making falls, resulting in larger number of children which 
implies that Iranian women have stronger preference for 
fewer children than their husbands. Finally, although there is 
no difference between the number of children among urban 
and rural households, the findings yield a support for the 
effective role of the other demographic determinants such 
as literacy, social norms of household size, and religion in 
fertility behavior of Iranian households.
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Implications for policy makers
•	 The result of this paper can help policy-makers to find the 
roots of the dramatic change in fertility rate in Iran during 
the last two recent decades. 
•	 The findings give policy-makers an opportunity to adopt 
the most influential policies if they wanted to affect 
Iranian fertility.
•	 Policy-makers should adopt suitable policies among 
Iranian provinces due to the economic, social and 
demographic differences of these provinces. 
Implications for public
This paper tries to study fertility behavior of Iranian 
household focusing on differences related to economic, 
cultural and demographic background. Iranian parents 
play a key role in the existing fertility trends. More 
importantly, wives have profound impact on fertility 
behavior of Iranian families.
Key Messages 
